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Discourse Analysis and Digital Surveillance 
Introduction 
 Some time ago I found a post on my Facebook Newsfeed asking, ‘Which Friends are 
Actually Your Mom and Dad?’ (Fig 1). Despite the underlying creepiness of the question, I was 
curious. So, I clicked on the link and was brought to a dialogue window (Fig 2) asking me if I 
would like to ‘Continue as Rodney?’ What it meant was not, did I want to continue being myself, 
but was I willing to share with a company called ‘Meaww World’ my ‘friends list, timeline 
posts, and photos’. Undeterred, I clicked ‘Okay’, and was immediately taken to a page with a 
pulsing progress bar and the words: ‘Calculating result…’ along with an advertisement for a sofa 
(Fig 3), which was useful given that I had just spent almost an hour browsing online furniture 
shops. Finally, the answer was revealed on a new page, famed by an array of additional 
advertisements for furniture, an online supermarket, and other fun quizzes I could take: based 
presumably on some algorithmic analysis of my personal information, Meaww World had 
determined that my two friends who could have been my parents were Simon (who could have 
been my Mom), and Dino (who could have been my Dad). Amused, I immediately posted the 
result on Facebook, When I did, of course, Simon and Dino, equally amused, shared it on their 
newsfeeds, and then went on to take the quiz themselves, giving Meaww World access to their 












 When we think of digital surveillance, we usually think of intelligence gathering by 
shadowy government agencies of the type uncovered by Edward Snowden. But most digital 
surveillance is more pedestrian, tied up with our everyday practices of searching the internet, 
engaging with friends on social media, shopping, and showing off. In fact, as Snowden’s 
revelations chillingly revealed, government surveillance programs like Prism and Mystic are 
intimately tied to our use of search engines, social media sites, and smartphones, through which 
we produce vast stores of data that can be exploited by advertisers, government agencies, and 
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more unsavory actors such as identity thieves and Russian hackers. The ‘Cambridge Analytica 
scandal’, for example, that may have contributed to the election 2016 of Donald Trump, actually 
started when researchers convinced Facebook users to take an online quiz called ‘This is Your 
Digital Life’, through which the company was eventually able to gain access to the data of over 
87 million Facebook users (Grassenger & Krogerus, 2017).  
 This short narrative does not just demonstrate the ubiquitous nature of digital 
surveillance, it also highlights a number of key-questions about digital surveillance that are 
relevant to the work of discourse analysts. The first is obviously the role of discourse in making 
the whole sequence of actions that resulted in me relinquishing my data possible, from the garish 
scrawl of the original invitation, to the oblique way in which Meaww Wolrd asked for my 
consent, to the language and layout of the barrage of advertisements that accompanied this 
process. When we think of digital surveillance, we are accustomed to thinking in terms of 
complex code, algorithms, and metadata — and, as I will discuss below, these new forms of 
‘language’ are indeed central to these processes—  but much of what makes digital surveillance 
possible has to do with the way more traditional ways discourse is deployed to lure users into 
making compromising decisions. Secondly, there are fundamental questions about ‘speakership’ 
and ‘listenership’: who exactly is the ‘author’ of the various texts involved here, including the 
original invitation, the resulting text which I shared with my friends on Facebook, and even the 
advertisements, which were in part the result of my own internet activities in the hour before I 
clicked on this quiz? And who is the audience: is it me, Simon and Dino, our various friends who 
are subjected to this unusual post showing up on their newsfeeds, or Meaww World, who, after 
all, is the recipient of all of the information we have disclosed? Thirdly, there are questions about 
‘meaning’: how did Meaww World come to the conclusion that Simon and Dino could have been 
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my parents? What was I trying to ‘say’ by reposting this text on my timeline, and, most 
importantly, what kinds of meanings are Meaww World and the third parties it might sell my 
data to able to infer about me based on the data it has gathered? Finally, why did I fall for this 
scam in the first place? What is it about the discursive strategies of this company, my 
relationships with my friends on social media, the social practices associated with this medium, 
and my own experiences of creating and interpreting texts online that made me decide to hand 
over all of the posts and pictures I have ever sent or received on Facebook to a company that I 
had never heard of?  
 In this chapter I will discuss how tools from discourse analysis can contribute to our 
understanding of digital surveillance, exploring how the interaction among social relationships, 
discourse practices and technological tools in contemporary digital and physical spaces has 
created a ‘communicative ecology’ (Foth & Hearn, 2007) in which nearly all of our social 
interactions are engineered to produce data of maximal value for internet companies, advertisers 
and governments. While much of this new communicative ecology is made possible by digital 
technologies and the sophisticated patterns of participation and methods of discourse processing 
they make available, much of it also depends on more fundamental practices of human 
communication that stretch back to the birth of human language itself (Dunbar, 1996), practices 
like gossip and boasting, and our seemingly insatiable desire to ‘see’ and ‘be seen’.  
   In what follows, I will first explore what insights from discourse analysis can contribute 
to our understanding of surveillance more generally. Then I will discuss the mediated nature of 
all surveillance and the different affordances and constraints different media bring to it. In the 
following section, I will give an overview of the main discursive processes involved in digital 
surveillance, including participation, pretexting, entextualization, recontextualization, and 
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inferencing, showing how they occur differently when mediated through digital technologies. 
Next, I will identify some of the key issues and ongoing debates around digital surveillance 
related to discourse analysis, specifically identity, agency, and power. I will then go onto discuss 
the implications of a discourse analytical approach to digital surveillance for the professional 
practices of applied and sociolinguists. Finally, I will lay out some future directions in which 
research on discourse and digital surveillance can move.  
 
Information Games 
To take a discourse analytical approach to surveillance means taking as a starting point the fact 
that surveillance is a pervasive fact of everyday life and always has been, even before the advent 
of social media sites and internet quizzes. Participation in social life is a matter of constantly 
being watched and ‘watching out for others’ either to protect them or to protect ourselves from 
them. As Trottier (2012: 18) observes, ‘Surveillance is ubiquitous, not just because of ubiquitous 
technologies, but because watching and assessing pervade nearly every social relationship.’ 
 This observation is at the heart of much of the work in psychology, sociology and 
linguistics which informs contemporary approaches to discourse analysis, from Ruesch and 
Bateson’s (1951) observation that the basis of human communication is the ‘perception of 
(being) perceived,’ to Goffman’s (1964, p. 135) definition of the social situation as ‘an 
environment of mutual monitoring possibilities’. For Goffman, social interaction is essentially a 
series of ,‘information games’, involving ‘potentially infinite cycle(s) of concealment, discovery, 
false revelation and rediscovery’ (1959, p. 13) through which we negotiate access to various 
‘territories of the self’ (1972), ranging from how visible our bodies and physical actions are to 
the degree to which we make available the ‘preserve’ of secrets that we hold inside our heads (or, 
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nowadays, inside of our digital devices). What is at issue for most people, says Goffman 
(1972:60), ‘is not whether a preserve is exclusively maintained or shared, or given up, but rather 
(that) the individual is allowed (to determine) what happens to his claim.’ What makes 
surveillance, in the usual sense the word is used, so unnerving for us is the fact that this claim is 
not being respected, that the information game is not being played ‘fairly’. In the word 
surveillance (Fr. ‘looking from above’) is an implication of information asymmetry, the notion 
that one party has the upper hand. But for Goffman, the need to address constant potential 
asymmetries in interaction and to negotiate the balance between what we know about others and 
what is known about us is an inescapable fact of social life.  
 All surveillance, then, cannot be regarded as necessarily nefarious or untoward. It is our 
ability to monitor others, and to negotiate how we are monitored by them, that is to a large 
degree responsible for our ability to ‘take action, seek information and communicate’ 
(Albrechtslund, 2008). Both surveillance and secrecy help produce the social world – they are at 
the heart of how we interact, manage our relationships, and organize our societies. And, in many 
situations, such as the one I described above, we willingly make ourselves available for 
surveillance, perceiving certain psychological or social benefits from being visible to others. 
‘The negotiation of social identity,’ says Phillips (2002, p. 416) ‘is not only about the 
construction and maintenance of boundaries, regions, and performances. It is also about 
negotiating the permeability of those boundaries.’  
 
Surveillance as Mediated Action 
 So how do media alter the way these negotiations are accomplished? In order to answer 
this question, it is good to remember that all surveillance is mediated, that is, it is made possible 
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by ‘technologies’ of one kind or another, be they windows, keyholes, binoculars, cameras, 
electronic listening devices, digital media, or just our own eyes and ears, and different media 
come with different affordances and constraints on who can be surveilled by whom, what kind of 
information can be gathered, and what can be done with that information (Jones, 2017a). 
 It is also good to remember that surveillance is never a single action— it always involves 
a chain of actions, each with explicit goals. Marx (2016), for example lists seven discrete actions 
that are usually involved in surveillance: 1) tool selection, 2) subject selection, 3) data collection, 
4) data processing/analysis, 5) data interpretation, 6) data use, and 7) data fate. Each of these 
actions may involve the same or different mediational means with the same or different  
affordances and constraints on how that particular action can be executed.  
 A range of scholars from sociology, media studies, information sciences and the 
burgeoning field of surveillance studies have commented on how digital technologies have 
changed the information game in regard to the different surveillance related actions delineated by 
Marx. One of the chief ways digital media have changed how surveillance is carried out, for 
example, is that they make the first two steps almost superfluous — there is no need to make 
choices about tools and subjects when the tools nearly all subjects are using (such as 
smartphones and social media accounts) make possible the surveillance of nearly everybody. As 
Haggerty and Ericson (2000, p. 606) point out, digital media have brought about ‘a rhizomatic 
levelling of the hierarchy of surveillance, such that groups which were previously exempt from 
routine surveillance are now increasingly being monitored.’ Just as it is no longer a matter of 
targeting specific people, it is also no longer a matter of utilizing specific technologies. With the 
rise of ‘ubiquitous computing’ has come ‘ubiquitous surveillance where wireless sensors are 
hidden inside of ordinary objects such as cars, kitchen appliances, toilets, buildings and clothes’ 
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(Marx, 2016), and information gathering is increasingly indiscriminate and automated. As 
Barnard-Willis (2012, p. 22) notes, ‘contemporary surveillance is driven by connections between 
seemingly disparate and previously discrete surveillance technologies, sites, practices and 
agents,’ what Haggerty and Ericson (2000) have famously referred to as ‘surveillant 
assemblages’. 
 The second important effect of digital technologies scholars have observed has been on 
the kinds of data that can be collected. In 1988 Roger Clarke coined the term ‘dataveillance’ to 
describe the ‘systematic use of personal data systems in the monitoring of people’s actions and 
communications’ (p. 498). Intelligence experts talk about the difference between surveillance 
engaged in through the actual observation of people (known as ‘human intelligence’ of ‘humint’) 
and that engaged in through the gathering of the ‘signals’ people give off from their use of 
technologies (known as ‘signals intelligence’ or ‘sigint’). Digital technologies have made 
possible a switch in surveillance techniques from the observation of actual persons to the 
observation of the ‘data trails’ they leave as they interact with technologies, the incidental 
‘exhaust’ of their mediated actions. This results in an increased focus on information that is, in 
Goffman’s (1963) terms, ‘given off’, gleaned from actions like clicking, swiping, searching, 
‘liking’ and traveling from one physical location too another, actions that are usually not even 
regarded as particularly ‘meaningful’ by those who produce them. In other words, they are not 
part of the traditional ‘preserves’ that Goffman says social actors typically guard access to.  
 What digital technologies make possible is the capture and recording of these manifold 
incidental actions in digital format, accumulated and aggregated into ‘big data’ sets that can be 
operated on by algorithms, which brings me to the third way digital technologies have changed 
the information game by introducing new and powerful ways of analyzing an interpreting data. 
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This introduces yet another level of asymmetry between the surveillers and the surveilled: not 
only are the surveilled unaware what information they produce might be rendered meaningful, 
but they are also (for the most part) unequipped to interrogate the processes through which this 
information is interpreted. Tene and Polonetsky (2013:255) compare the relationship between 
internet platforms and their users to a ‘game of poker where one of the players has his hand open 
and the other keeps his cards close.’  
 The final way digital technologies have been seen to effect surveillance has to do with the 
‘use’ and ultimate ‘fate’ of the data collected. While the effects of much digital surveillance, 
especially of the commercial kind, seem relatively innocuous, resulting in things like targeted 
advertising and discount offers, in reality the ‘social sorting’ (Lyon, 2003) that underpins these 
uses can act to reinforce social and economic inequalities and even lead to dangerous political 
polarization in the pursuit of profit (Lanier, 2018). Surveillance of any type has the consequences 
of exasperating the kinds of power asymmetries that made it possible in the first place (Graham, 
1998), but the efficiency with which digital technologies are able to ‘sort’ the subjects of 
surveillance results in a pervasive prioritization of ‘certain people’s mobilities, service quality 
and life chances, while simultaneously reducing those of less favored groups’ (such as lower 
income people and minorities) (Graham & Wood, 2003).  
 While all of these observations are certainly true, they do not sufficiently capture the 
discursive and interactive dimensions of digital surveillance that are so conspicuous in the 
example with which I began this chapter: the way digital surveillance is made possible both 
through various kinds of semi-consensual transactions between users and companies and through 
myriad transactions between users themselves who post, like, share, and otherwise circulate 
information about one another in a digitized version of Goffman’s information game. They also 
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do not sufficiently highlight how surveillance is crucially supported by complex, chained 
processes of text production and consumption in which information is continually transformed 
and recontextualized, its meaning potential changing along the way. Finally, they do not 
sufficiently address the pragmatic aspects of digital surveillance, the ways technologies are 
transforming not just how data are ‘interpreted’, but how meanings are inferred more generally. 
These are aspects of digital surveillance that only an approach informed by discourse analysis 
can address. While discourse analysis has had some place in surveillance studies, it has mostly 
been used to critique the way surveillance is represented and justified in texts like newspaper 
articles and political speeches and through genres such as reality television (e.g. McGrath, 2004; 
Tiainen, 2017) rather than to examine the actual communicative processes that surveillance 
entails (Barnard-Wills, 2012). The framework outlined below is intended to highlight those 
aspects of digital surveillance that are amenable to interrogation by discourse analysts.  
 
Overview: Discourse and Digital Surveillance 
  A discourse analytical perspective on digital surveillance involves asking what discursive 
processes it entails: what possibilities for interaction, what sorts of interactional roles, and what 
forms of meaning making. These processes can be divided up into 1) participation: the way 
digital media create different possibilities for mutual monitoring and different interactional roles 
and responsibilities; 2) pretexting: the strategies used to compel people to disclose information 
about themselves; 3) entextualization: the ways digital media facilitate the transformation of 
actions into text/code and the kinds of meanings that are preserved, lost and changed through 
these processes; 4) recontextualization: the way information gathered through digital surveillance 
is transported into different textual contexts and combined with other information to produce 
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new meanings and new possibilities for action; and 5) inferencing: the ways meanings are 
inferred from data and used to determine the subsequent kinds of texts and interactions to which 
users are exposed. Although these processes sometimes happen in succession, as in Marx’s 
(2016) more ‘analogue’ account of ‘surveillance strips’, they more often constitute recursive 
moves in a complex system of feedback loops in which, for example, inferences arrived at 
through the analysis of data from multiple sources feeds into the formulation of pretexts for the 
gathering of yet more data. In the following sections I will discuss these processes in more detail.  
 
Participation  
 The meaning of participation from a discourse analytical perspective has to do not just 
with who is included in a particular interaction but also what communicative rights and 
responsibilities different participants have. When it comes to surveillance the key question about 
participation is: who is watching whom? Most models imagine rather static, dyadic participant 
roles of, as Marx (2012, p. xxv) puts it, a ‘surveillance agent 
(watcher/observer/seeker/inspector/auditor/tester)’ and the ‘surveillance subject’: ‘the person 
about whom information is sought.’ Marx does go on, however, to imagine other kinds of 
participants associated with the ‘watcher’ role, for example, ‘sponsors, data collectors, and initial 
and secondary users of the data.’ Digital security experts have a slightly more elaborate scheme 
of participants, each with a conventionalized nickname: ‘Alice’ and ‘Bob’ for sender and 
receiver of communications which might be intercepted by ‘Eve’ (for eavesdropper), ‘Carol’ (for 
third person), ‘Chuck’ (for malicious participant), ‘Mallet (for active intruder), ‘Trent’ (for 
trusted third party) and ‘Grace’ (for government agent) (Rivest, Shamir, & Adleman, 1978). But 
even this more elaborate model of participation is constructed along the binary poles of ‘watcher’ 
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and ‘watched’. In networked interactions of the kind described at the beginning of this chapter, 
however, the distinction between the monitor and the monitored is not so clear-cut. In many 
ways, in fact, this particular transaction is based upon different actors taking on multiple roles as 
different kinds of ‘watchers’ and different kinds of ‘watched’. One of the main reasons digital 
media have such a profound impact on the way surveillance is carried out is that they have a 
profound impact on the way social interaction is carried out more generally, making available 
more flexible frameworks for participation and creating ways for different kinds of participation 
frameworks to articulate with one another. As Haggerty (2006, p. 26) puts it, ‘the multiplication 
of sites of surveillance’ made possible through new technologies  
ruptures the unidirectional nature of the gaze, transforming surveillance from a dynamic 
microscope to one where knowledge and images of unexpected intensity and assorted 
distortions cascade from viewer to viewer and across institutions, emerging in 
unpredictable configurations and combinations, while undermining the neat distinction 
between watchers and watched through a proliferation of criss-crossing, overlapping and 
intersecting scrutiny.  
 This view of participation is, in fact, much more in line with what sociolinguists and 
discourse analysts, have long noted, that, as Hymes (1974, p. 54) put it, ‘the common dyadic 
model of speaker-hearer specifies ... too many, sometimes too few, sometimes the wrong 
participants.’ All social interactions involve the possibilities for multiple modes of production 
and participation among participants, some ratified, and some unratified (Goffman, 1981). Face-
to-face conversations also sometimes have auditors, bystanders, and even eavesdroppers. What 
technology does is shift the opportunities different participants have for ‘mutual monitoring’. 
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 Media in general contribute to the formation of participation frameworks by enabling and 
limiting how communication takes place, how it circulates, and who has access to it (Hutchby, 
2001). In my previous work (Jones, 2009), I compared the affordances of new media to 
architectural features like walls and windows which make both surveillance and privacy possible 
in physical environments. Digital media, I noted, give users tools to negotiate and modulate their 
visibility. Since then, however, fuelled by advances in mobile technologies and the rise of 
platforms whose main business model is extracting data from users, digital environments have 
become more like a house of mirrors (Johnson & Regan, 2014). Negotiations of surveillance and 
privacy are bound up in a web of multiple tiny acts of people watching each other and offering 
themselves up to be watched, all driven by algorithmic feedback loops which drive them deeper 
and deeper into interactions in which they are more likely to disclose more and more 
information. 
 These complex new participation frameworks create challenges for people as they try to 
regulate flows of information and maintain privacy. They also create challenges for discourse 
analysts, as they attempt to adapt analogue models of speakership and listenership to digital 
environments (also see chapter by Blommaert, Smits & Yacoubi, this volume). Just as in our 
analogue interactions, the selves that we construct online are largely a result of ‘a tacit 
negotiation between ourselves and our imagined auditors (Bowker, 2005, p. 7). On the one hand, 
people use social media to ‘be seen’, motivated to engage in consensual surveillance by a 
competition for social status, while on the other, they employ a rage of strategies to avoid ‘over 
exposure’ such as self-censorship, producing polysemic performances that contain different 
messages for different audiences (boyd, 2012), using contextualization strategies to negotiate the 
appropriateness of different messages (Tagg, Seargeant, & Brown, 2017), and alternately 
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disclosing and withdrawing information in a form of ‘virtual identity hide and seek’ 
(Papacharissi & Gibson, 2011, p. 81).  
 Where older models of participation and audience design are less useful is in 
understanding the increased role of auditors, bystanders and eavesdroppers in nearly all of the 
interactions we have online. Although Bell (1984) talked about the ‘auditor effect’ in social 
interactions, auditors in his model are secondary participants, and eavesdroppers are hardly 
considered participants at all. For most social media users, however, some awareness of the 
presence of eavesdroppers is a given, whether they be unratified human participants or faceless 
corporations mining their data, and a means needs to be developed to measure the degree to 
which this awareness changes their communication.  
 Another issue that older models of participation do not address is the presence of what 
Latour (2007) calls ‘new unexpected actors’, audiences composed not of humans but of software 
programs and algorithms who participate in communicative exchanges as ‘(inter)active co-
conspirators’ with both agents and subjects of surveillance (Hess, 2014). Some people, for 
example, report altering the way they communicate online based on how they believe algorithms 
might process and act upon their words, while at the same time, certain interfaces are designed to 
inspire almost unabashed honesty. As a recent editorial in the IEEE newsletter Technology & 
Society noted: ‘We don’t lie to our search engine. We’re more intimate with it than with our 
friends’ (‘Ubiquitous Surveillance and Security’, 2017).  
 Finally, and what is perhaps most striking about the forms of participation enabled by 
digital media, is that they are almost entirely driven by economic imperatives. On the one hand, 
internet companies design interfaces that favour certain kinds of interactions over others, 
offering, for example, the low-cost conviviality of the ‘like’ button (Jones & Hafner, 2012) 
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because it has the effect of generating more useful data about people’s preferences and 
personalities. On the other hand, users constantly find themselves engaging in cost-benefit 
analyses in which the benefits of participation in the network are measured against the costs of 
exposure of their ‘information preserves’. Information has increasingly become the currency we 
must expend to engage in social life.  
 
Pretextuality 
 The forms of participation digital media make possible, however, are not enough to make 
the scale of surveillance internet companies engage in possible, particularly in contexts like the 
European Union where regulations such as the GDPR require agents of surveillance to make 
their processes of data collection more transparent  (European Comission, 2017). In fact, most 
surveillance through digital technologies (even much of that conducted by government agents) is 
carried out within a framework of ‘consent’ or, at least, ‘semi-consent’, in which subjects of 
surveillance are asked to voluntarily relinquish their data. In these circumstances, surveillers 
must formulate ‘pretexts’ in order to get people to open their information preserves to scrutiny.  
 The notion of ‘pretexting’ comes from the field of social engineering, where it is defined 
as ‘the act of creating an invented scenario to persuade a targeted victim to release information or 
perform some action’ (Hadnagy, 2010, chapter 4). In this context, it is usually associated with 
con-men or online scammers like ‘Nigerian princes’ (Blommaert & Omoniyi, 2006). For 
discourse analysts, the idea of the pretext is much broader. Pretexts are seen as necessary 
conditions for all communication, sets of expectations text producers and text consumers bring to 
interaction as a way of negotiating common ground. As Widdowson (2004, p. 79) puts it: ‘All 
texts are designed to be understood pre-textually…it is the pretextual purpose that we bring to 
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texts that controls how we engage with them.’ Another way of understanding pretexts from the 
discourse analytical perspective is Maryns and Blommaert’s (2002, p. 11) definition of them as 
‘conditions on sayability’—the practices, competencies and contextual frames that make it 
possible for certain people to credibly engage in certain kinds of interactions. From this 
perspective, pretexts always involve issues of power as different people bring different pretextual 
resources to communication. When it comes to pretexts for digital surveillance, both perspectives 
are relevant: digital pretextuality both creates the contexts for people to disclose personal 
information and creates what Maryns and Blommaert (p. 11) call ‘pretextual gaps’, characterised 
by increasing asymmetries in pretextual resources between surveillers and surveilled.  
 Internet companies create pretexts for us to surrender information in three ways. First are 
what might be called ‘paradigmatic pretexts’ in which scenarios and genres are created to give us 
reasons to disclose information. These include scenerios like calling a taxi or playing an online 
game. Palen and Dourish  (2003) note that digital media have given rise to a new range of genres 
which they call ‘genres of disclosure’, genres like status updates and internet quizzes that are 
designed to compel users to share information. These genres are embedded in platforms whose 
‘default settings’ are designed to encourage maximum visibility. While users are usually given 
the opportunity to change default privacy settings, the power of genres and default settings to 
channel people into certain kinds of behaviour is strong, partially because of the ‘transaction 
costs’ involved in changing default settings or resisting the norms associated with particular 
genres.  
 The second form of pretexting common in digital environments might be called 
‘syntagmatic pretexts’, those that operate as a result of the ways utterances and actions are 
sequenced. Widdowson (2004), drawing on the work of Garfinkel (1986), argues that pretexts 
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are not a matter of static identities and situations; they are about dynamically negotiating 
identities and situations as ‘ongoing accomplishments’ through the moment by moment 
application of ‘practical reasoning’. This kind of sequential reasoning comes into play in the 
design of ‘click wraps’ and other permission dialogues to gain consent for information gathering 
which are presented to users either at strategic points in ongoing processes (such as right when 
users want to take a picture with their phone or locate a place in a map app), so that users are 
inclined to ‘agree’ to what’s being asked of them, just to get on with the process. 
 Finally there are what might be called ‘emergent pretexts’ that arise from interfaces’ 
incessant requests for disclosure that cause users to become ‘habituated’ to giving consent 
(Longford, 2005). One example of this is the way the constant requests by websites for 
permission to use cookies required by laws such as Europe’s GDPR has resulted the routinization 
of consent, an emergent environment in which giving up personal data is seen as a necessary and 
unremarkable part of accessing information (see below, also Jones 2018, Kim, 2013) 
 
Entextualization  
 Surveillance has always been about the production and circulation of texts. It is not 
enough to monitor someone—the results of that monitoring must somehow be ‘documented’. As 
Gitelman (2014) notes, in his treatise on ‘paperwork’ and modern bureaucracies, the ‘knowing-
showing’ dimension of documentation is not just about recording information, but about 
controlling the way people understand the social orders that they inhabit. What makes this 
possible is the process of entextualization, the transformation of messages, actions and identities 
into texts. What is ‘known’ and ‘shown’ about subjects of surveillance is largely determined by 
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how the modes and media employed to document their actions make them ‘legible’ (Scott, 
1999). 
 Bauman and Briggs (1990, p 73) define entextualization as ‘the process of rendering 
discourse extractable, of making a stretch of linguistic production into a unit-a text-that can be 
lifted out of its interactional setting.’ This process, they say, is always, to some degree, an 
exercise of power, since those who entextualize reality are able to decide what aspects of reality 
are captured and how they are represented. They write: 
To decontextualize and recontextualize a text is thus an act of control, and in regard to 
the differential exercise of such control the issue of social power arises. More 
specifically, we may recognize differential access to texts, differential legitimacy in 
claims to and use of texts, differential competence in the use of texts, and differential 
values attaching to various types of texts. (p. 76)  
 Digital media have fundamentally changed how entextualization is carried out in 
practices of surveillance in terms of what is entextualized, the way it is encoded, and the way 
these coded artefacts are circulated. Whereas in the past, surveillance produced analogue 
documents and sometimes images which operated within the epistemological boundaries of 
human language, digital surveillance produces digital documents which operate within a very 
different epistemology, the logic of code. And what can be ‘known/shown’ through code is very 
different from what can be ‘known/shown’ through language. 
Dodge and Kitchin (2005) make a useful distinction between ‘data’, all possible 
information about something, and ‘capta’, the information that a system is able to record and 
store. For computer systems, ‘capta’ consists primarily of streams of gestures — clicks, swipes, 
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‘likes’, etc. — that people perform through interfaces -- referred to as ‘click-streams’. The 
mistake many people make when it comes to digital surveillance is being vigilant about what 
they ‘say’ online, not about what they do: those thousands of tiny actions that produce what 
Battlle  (2005) calls ‘a massive click- stream database of desires, needs, wants, and preferences’. 
The fact is that digital surveillance systems are not yet very good at dealing with the ‘content’ of 
our communication. They are much better at recording binary actions in the form of ‘metadata’. 
In the case of surveillance, however, this can actually be an advantage. While too much data can 
overwhelm surveillance systems and sometimes distort perceptions due to ‘noise’, more 
metadata can make analysis more accurate (Blaze, 2013). Collecting metadata is often 
discounted as less intrusive than actually ‘reading people’s emails’ or ‘listening to people’s 
phone calls’: as Reilly (2014) puts it, ‘metadata is the envelope, not the letter’. Numerous studies 
(see for example Kosinski, Stillwell, & Graepel, 2013; MIT Media Lab, n.d.), however, have 
shown that a great deal about people’s psychology, personal habits, desires, intentions and even 
future behaviours can be inferred through metadata. ‘Metadata’ writes Blaze (2013), ‘can reveal 
far more about us, both individually and as groups, than the words we speak.’ As General 
Michael Hayden, former head of the CIA more bluntly puts it: ‘We kill people based on 
metadata’ (Cole, 2014). 
 
Recontextualization 
 The flip side of entextualization is recontextualization, the ways documents of 
surveillance are transported and embedded into different contexts, and the ways these different 
contexts change the meanings of texts and and what they can be used for. For some privacy 
scholars, the main way surveillance violates privacy is not through the collection of information, 
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but though the introduction of that information into contexts for which it was not intended, 
violating what Nissenbaum (2009) calls, ‘contextual integrity’.  
 A central characteristic of digital media is the fact that they facilitate recontextualzation; 
they are built upon a logic of ‘data flows’ that encourages social norms of sharing, linking, 
embedding and re-circulating texts. In daily social interactions, this constant ‘disembedding’ 
(Giddens, 1991) of actions and utterances from their contexts creates multiple challenges for 
communication. When it comes to digital surveillance, however, the key aspect of 
recontextualzation is not the way information is transported into different social contexts as 
much as it is the way it is transported into different informational contexts. The emergence of 
data management platforms allows surveillers to combine information collected about users not 
just with information collected about the same users from different sources, but also with 
information from millions of other users.  
 Furthermore, this flow of information from dataset to dataset is constant and dynamic. 
Rather than using the term recontextualization, Haggerty and Ericson (2000) borrow from 
Deleuze & Guattari (1987) the notions of ‘deterritorialization’ and ‘reterritorialization’, which 
involve not just inserting information into new contexts but reshaping abstracted content into 
different forms through combining it with other content. A key aspect of Deleuze & Guattari’s 
notions of ‘deterritorialization’ and ‘reterritorialization’ is what they call ‘lines of flight’, the 
different trajectories that information takes and how these trajectories develop their own 
momentum. With the speed and efficiency of digital networks, it is not just a matter of 
information being transported from one context to another, but information moving along 
trajectories of recontextualization.  
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Inferencing 
 The final way digital surveillance differs from analogue surveillance from a discourse 
analytical perspective is in how information is processed and what is done with it. All 
surveillance involves a certain amount of ‘inferencing’ — the data that is gathered is always to 
some degree incomplete and ultimately has to be ‘pieced together’ to produce theories about the 
significance of what subjects of surveillance have said or done. In digital surveillance, these 
inferences are formed by algorithms working on the kinds of large sets of data described above. 
But the way algorithms make inferences is very different from the way people do. While humans 
form inferences through a logic of causation in which we try to discern why someone said what 
they did by testing it against some mutually agreed upon theory of communication such as 
Grice’s (1989) cooperative principle, algorithms form inferences based on a logic of correlation 
in which ‘Meaning is constructed mathematically, probabilistically, based on correlations 
between pieces of input’ (Jones, in press, see also Anderson, 2008; Ayres, 2008). Although these 
associations are often made based on assumptions about communication and identity held by the 
people who have written and trained these algorithms, inferences themselves are based on 
decontextualized Bayesian probabilities rather than on situated human reasoning. This can often 
result in startlingly accurate inferences, such as when algorithms are able to predict with a high 
degree of probability a Facebook user’s skin colour, political affiliation, sexuality, religion, 
alcohol, cigarette and drug use, and even whether their parents were divorced on the basis of as 
few as sixty eight ‘likes’ (Kosinski et al., 2013), not because of human assumptions about the 
kinds of things people of a certain ethnicity or political persuasion might ‘like’, but because of 
the ability of algorithms to detect patterns in the past ‘liking’ behaviour of millions of other 
users. On the other hand, inferences based on big data correlations do sometimes get it wrong, 
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and when they do, there is no mutually accepted norm of reasoning or theory of communication 
to appeal to for victims. 
 Another characteristic of algorithmic inferencing is that it is less about understanding the 
past as it is predicting the future. In his book on search, John Battelle (2005) calls the stores of 
information that companies gather about internet users a ‘database of intention’, an apt phrase 
because what this database is chiefly used for is making judgments about the probability of 
future behaviour — what people intend to do next. Moreover, the generation of predictive 
models based on information gathered from present interactions ends up determining the kinds of 
interactions that will be available to people in the future. In other words, predictive inferencing 
ends up creating feedback loops which often end up causing the very actions or attitudes that 
they predict, as, for example, when an algorithm infers that a user is a Donald Trump supporter 
and so feeds her increasing quantities of pro-Trump content, giving her the impression that pro-
Trump sentiments are more widespread than they actually are. Magnet and Gates (2009, p. 3) see 
this ‘cybernetic quality of [digital] surveillance—the capacity to feed personal data about 
individuals back into the mechanisms of social control’ as one of the main things that 
‘distinguish newer techniques from earlier, less interactive forms of monitoring.’ 
 
Key Issues and Ongoing Debates 
These discursive changes in the way surveillance is carried out due to the introduction of 
digital technologies do not just impact the way we understand surveillance, but also force us to 
rethink a number of key issues in discourse analysis such as identity, agency and power (also see 
chapter by De Fina & Georgakopoulou, this volume). It has become axiomatic, for example, in 
discourse analytical circles to regard identity as socially constructed and dynamically negotiated 
in interaction (see for example Bucholtz & Hall, 2005). The forms of participation, 
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entextualization and inferencing that support digital surveillance, however, promote a way of 
understanding identity that assumes that it is ‘based upon probabilistic and actuarial logics’ 
(Barnard-Wills, 2012, p. 153) rather than interactional dynamics. This does not mean that the 
‘data doubles’ (Haggerty & Ericson 2000:614) that are constructed of us as a result of digital 
surveillance are static—like analogue identities, they are also contingent and negotiated — but 
what they are contingent on is not the social contexts in which we act, but the informational 
contexts through which our data flows. In his book We are Data, Cheney-Lippold (2017) notes 
how algorithmically produced categories like man, woman, Asian, and wealthy have little to do 
with the actual social categories of gender, race and class, and more to do with ‘a proprietary 
vocabulary’ intended for ‘marketers, political campaigns (and) government dragnets.’ ‘Who we 
are in the face of algorithmic interpretation’ he writes:  
is who we are computationally calculated to be… composed of an almost innumerable 
collection of interpretive layers, of hundreds of different companies and agencies 
identifying us in thousands of competing ways. At this very moment, Google may 
algorithmically think I’m male, whereas digital advertising company Quantcast could say 
I’m female, and web-analytic firm Alexa might be unsure. (p.5, 6) 
 Second is the issue of agency and the degree of control we are able to exercise over our 
actions. In a situation where software allows an increasingly greater degree of mental processes 
to be delegated to computational systems (Berry, 2011), agency, in the words of Introna (2011, p. 
118) ‘becomes increasingly encapsulated, nested as codes within codes within codes.’ It is not 
just that many of the information games we play in our social lives are becoming automated, but 
also that software might be ‘training’ us to surrender our agency. A good example of this is the 
issue of consent, where the form and volume of dialogue boxes asking us to grant consent give 
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rise to what Rock calls ‘tick box consent’ (2016). Consent gathering processes are often 
engineered ‘to skew individual decision-making, in effect creating an illusion of free choice that 
helps to legitimatize surveillance practices’ (Kerr, Lucock, & Steeves, 2009, p.). Unfortunately, 
most technical and legislative solutions which aim to help people regain control of their data are 
based on the flawed assumption that the more we are asked to give our consent for data 
gathering, the more control we have over it. On the contrary, the deluge of permission dialogues 
that are required by such laws as Europe’s General Data Protection Regulations likely results in a 
kind of ‘consent fatigue’, with users more and more likely to suspend judgement and just click 
‘agree’ (Jones, 2018).  
 Perhaps the most important tasks of discourse analysts, however, is understanding how 
electronic surveillance changes the way power is discursively constituted and exercised. What 
has been called the ‘information revolution’, says Andrejevic (2015, p. x), is better 
conceptualized as a surveillance revolution in which exercises of power are increasingly 
‘informatic’. This power operates on both the maco-level, as large platforms hoard vast stores of 
data which allow them to dictate the parameters of communication, commerce, and, increasingly, 
governance, and, on the micro-level, as the surveillance agendas of the platforms dictate the 
kinds of social interactions and the kinds of life chances individuals can have. What has been 
missing from critiques of power in digital surveillance is a thorough understanding of how power 
is enabled and exercised through the discursive dimensions of surveillance, how, for example, 
the ‘encoding of human experience’ forces users of digital media to ‘submit to particular ways of 
categorizing and conceptualizing the world’ (Duranti, 2011, p. 29), how asymmetries in 
information processing capabilities create ‘pretextual gaps’ (Maryns & Blommaert, 2002), and 
how, through the transformation of bodies into information, individuals are fragmented, 
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disciplined and denied authentic opportunities for communication in which identities are 
situated, relational and mutually negotiated (Anthamatten, 2015). 
 
Implications for professional practice 
Whether we like it or not, linguists are deeply implicated in the creation and maintenance of the 
modern surveillance apparatus. There is, for example, a long history of linguists cooperating with 
intelligence services in areas like language teaching and cryptology. Linguists contribute to the 
monitoring and disciplining of migrants through lending their forensic expertise to the evaluation 
of claims for refugee status and developing language tests which operate as tools of 
normalization and control (Shohamy, 2014). Linguists write the natural language processing 
algorithms used to capture and analyse both intelligence data and data on consumer behaviour, 
and even in our teaching we submit our students to a wide array of surveillance practices, many 
enabled by digital media such as plagiarism detection software and learning analytics platforms. 
 At the same time, applied linguists and discourse analyst can also be part of the solution, 
contributing to a robust critique of digital surveillance and helping citizens to regain agency and 
control over their information. Discourse analysts, for example, can help to formulate design 
solutions such as interfaces that more effectively elicit genuine consent from users when their 
data is being collected or enable them to monitor the data they are giving to others (Nguyen & 
Mynatt, 2002). They can also help to design and implement curricula that alert students to the 
discursive aspects of digital surveillance and give them opportunities to productively reflect upon 
how they interact with both human and non-human actors within surveillant assemblages (see for 
example Jones, 2017b). Finally, applied linguists and discourse analysts can make a contribution 
to advocacy and critique, both in the workplace by, for example raising ethical issues about the 
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use of digital platforms to gather data about students and staff (Slade & Prinsloo, 2013), and 
outside the classroom, calling attention to policies that allow governments and private entities to 
gather data about citizens and helping to document and critique how digital surveillance affects 
the experiences and rights of migrants and refugees (see for example Khan, 2019).  
 
Future Directions 
 The main aim of this chapter has been to make a case for the application of tools from 
discourse analysis to understanding and critiquing digital surveillance. Future work in this area 
will need to respond both to rapid technological changes which introduce increasingly 
sophisticated ways to gather information about people and theoretical and methodological 
advances in the field of discourse analysis.  
 One key-development that will need to be addressed is the rise of biometric technologies, 
which present challenges to the way we understand how bodies and information are 
interconnected (Ploeg, 2003), challenges which dovetail with trends in sociolinguistics that 
advocate for more attention to the embodied dimensions of communication (see for example 
Bucholtz & Hall, 2016). As Hayles (1993, p. 162) writes: ‘embodiment mediates between 
technology and discourse by creating new experiential frameworks that serve as boundary 
markers for the creation of corresponding discursive systems.’ 
 Another important challenge will be the increasing sophistication of intelligent agents 
embedded in all sorts of mundane objects like toothbrushes, television sets and automobiles. 
Here the recent turn in applied linguistics toward post-human theory (Pennycook, 2017) holds 
the promise of helping us to understand how the ‘agency’ of objects affects how we play the 
information game (also see chapter by Lamb & Higgins, this volume). Increased interest in the 
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role of ‘affect’ in digital communication (Bucher, 2017, Wee, 2015) will also contribute to future 
research on the discursive and interactive dimensions of digital surveillance, addressing how the 
new ‘affective economies’ (Ahmed, 2004) online might change how people communicate (also 
see chapter by Giaxoglou & Seargeant, this volume).  
 The most important thing for discourse analysts tackling the issue of digital surveillance 
will be to avoid beginning with a priori assumptions about the roles and identities of ‘surveillers’ 
and ‘surveilled’ and to focus on the complex and contingent nature of online surveillance in 
which both humans and non-human actors assume multiple positions, construct multiple 
identities and engage in myriad micro-strategies of compliance or resistance moment by moment 
though the medium of discourse (Barnard-Wills, 2012).  
 
Summary 
This chapter has presented an overview of the discursive dimensions of digital surveillance. It 
began with an account of the ways other disciplines have seen the relationship between 
surveillance and digital media. It then went on to argue that surveillance is, to some degree, part 
of all interactions as individuals and institutions employ different discursive strategies to conceal 
or disclose information about themselves and gather and process information about others. The 
chapter explained five aspects of digital surveillance relevant to discourse analysts: 1) 
participation (the way digital media make available unique opportunities for ‘mutual 
monitoring’), 2) pretexting (the strategies used to get users of digital media to surrender their 
data); 3) entextualization (the way digital media facilitate the capture and encoding of data); 4) 
recontextualization (the way digital media affect the way data are circulated); and 5) inferencing 
(the way inferences are made based on datasets). The chapter then went on to identify some key 
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issues in discourse analysis impacted by digital surveillance as well as some implications for the 
professional practices of discourse analysts and other scholars of language. The chapter ended by 
considering how more recent trends in discourse analysis around such notions as embodiment 
(see chapter by Busch, this volume), post-humanism, and affect might inform future work on 





Barnard-Wills, D. (2012). Surveillance and Identity: Discourse, Subjectivity and the State. 
Farnham: Ashgate.  
This is one of the few examples in surveillance studies to seriously engage with theories of 
discourse analysis, exploring how regimes of surveillance discursively construct social identities 
and relationships between citizens/customers and the state and corporations.  
 
Jones, R. (2017) Surveillant media: Technology, language and control. In C. Cotter and D. Perrin 
(eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Language and Media. London, Routledge, 244-261. 
This chapter gives a comprehensive explanation of the impact of different kinds of media on the 
discursive processes involved in surveillance.  
 
Jones, R. (accepted); ‘Folk algorithmics’: Reading and writing in the age of the algorithm. 
Linguistics and Education.  
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This article looks at digital surveillance from the point of view of users of digital media, 
reporting on a research project in which participants described their ‘folk theories’ of how 
algorithms work and reflected on how these theories affected the way they communicated.  
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